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Abstract Scientific knowledge on a population’s religious composition is essential to
understand the challenges faced by societies today. It arises in opposition to specula-
tions about the actual size of religious groups that have been increasingly present in the
public discourse in Europe for many years. This is particularly the case in Austria
where the flows of refugees and migrants coming from the Middle East and Afghan-
istan have intensified since 2011 and culminated in 2015. These sparked a debate on
the actual size of the Muslim population in Austria. This study fills the gap by
presenting estimates of the religious composition for 2016 and projections until 2046
based on several scenarios related to the three major forces affecting the religious
composition: migration (including asylum seekers), differential fertility and
secularisation. The projections demonstrate that religious diversity is bound to increase,
mostly through immigration and fertility. We further focus on the role and implications
of international migration on the age and sex composition within the six religious
groups: Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims, other religions and unaffil-
iated. We find that the volume and composition of international migrants can maintain
youthful age compositions in minority religions—Muslims and Orthodox. Sustained
immigration leads to slower ageing but does not stop or reverse the process. The
disparity between older majority and younger minority religious groups will further
increase the cultural generation gap.
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Introduction
Historically, religious identity has been rather a feature of social structure and cultural
construct than an individual choice (Hammond 1992). Since the Reformation, Austria
has been a Roman Catholic country, with small pockets of Protestant and Jewish
populations. This started to change in the first half of the twentieth century with the
rise of secularisation as well as with forced migration movements during and after
WWII. These trends affected many European countries. Another trend became prom-
inent after the 1950s when labour migration opened western Europe to ‘new’ religions
that had been only marginally represented beforehand, mainly Muslims and Christian
Orthodox. Until the first oil crisis in 1973, Austria among other western European
countries recruited cheap and unskilled workers to fill labour shortages in the context of
booming economies (Messina 2007). These migrants often came through guest worker
programmes based on treaties between receiving countries, e.g. Germany and Austria,
and sending countries, e.g. Turkey and Yugoslavia, to name a few, or through former
colonial ties, like in the case of France with Algeria (Zimmermann 1995). While the
first post-WWII economic crisis that followed the 1973 oil crisis put an end to this
migration, but this was only temporary as it was followed by more waves of dependents
and extended families of this first generation. Religious diversity also increased through
migrations that arose from political crises in neighbouring countries such as the
Yugoslavian war and after the collapse of the communist regimes in the central and
eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, since the mid-twentieth century,
international migration has altered, through several distinct flows, the religious land-
scape of countries and cities across Europe (see Knippenberg 2010 for the Netherlands;
Goujon et al. 2007 for Austria; Stonawski et al. 2015 for Spain).
At the same time, Europe was going through another phenomenon: secularisation. In
the strict sense of the word, it reflects the fact that some Christian Europeans became
atheists or agnostics, but more appropriately, it is used in the broad sense, implying that
religion has gradually lost its overarching importance in people’s lives and has become
more of an individual characteristic. Turner (2011, p. xi) speaks about this phenomenon
as Ba ‘de-Christianisation’ of Europe rather than secularisation, and hence about a
‘post-Christian Europe’ rather than a secular Europe^.
The two phenomena of an increasing number of religious minorities and ongoing
secularisation have been very present in Austria, and particularly, since the 1970s, they
have upset the previous religious homogeneity: the share of Roman Catholics has
declined from 87 to 75% between 1971 and 2001 (the last time religious affiliation was
measured in the census).1 During the same period, the share of those without any
1 Since 2001, data on religious affiliation have been no longer available. In 2011, Austria moved to a
completely register-based census, not releasing data on religious affiliation. Data on religious affiliation are
collected in the Central Register of Residence. However, filling in one’s religion in the registration form is not
compulsory.
Potančoková M. et al.
religious affiliation rose from 4 to 12% and that of the Muslim community rose from nil
to 4%.
Both trends of secularisation and religious diversification that are shaping the
religious landscape of Austria today can be quantified as data are available to estimate
the number of individuals in several large religious categories. Since the last count of
religious affiliation in the 2001 census, the enlargement of the European Union has
increased migration flows from the neighbouring new member countries, and recently,
the Arab spring in 2011 and the wars in Iraq and Syria have caused the displacement of
populations from there who fled to neighbouring countries and to Europe. Other
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and dire poverty in further countries lead more
people to look for opportunities elsewhere. In 2015, Austria registered more than
88,000 asylum applications—10.3 per 1000 residents and became one of the major
receiving countries of asylum seekers (Migration Policy Institute Data Hub based on
Eurostat). It is therefore evident that religious plurality has continued to rise in Austria
but to what extent is not known.
We are addressing this gap using mostly demographic methods to assess—from the
existing data—the demographic behaviours of the population by religious affiliation (in
terms of fertility and migration) as well as the secularisation patterns prevalent in the
different religious groups. These data are then used to estimate the current (2016)
religious composition of Austria,2 employing multistate population projection method-
ology. Second, we project the religious composition according to narrative scenarios
about what possible future development/trends might develop. The work presented
here is an extension of previous efforts, with regard to both a refinement of the model
and the data used (Goujon et al. 2007; Goujon 2014).
The main output of this work is data on sizes and shares of the six main religious
groups—Roman Catholics, Protestants, Christian Orthodox, Muslims, religiously un-
affiliated and other religions—in terms of religious affiliation. Religious affiliation
captures the ‘belonging’ dimension of religiosity.3 It can be understood as a form of
identification representing the cultural background of a person (Bouma 1992). It does
not reflect the behavioural dimension nor beliefs that are other important dimensions of
religiosity.4 In other words, our reconstruction and projections provide estimations
regarding confessional categories but due to data limitations do not capture other
dimensions. Although religious intensity is important, there are several reasons why
the work presented in this article is relevant nevertheless. Scientific knowledge on a
population’s religious composition is essential to understand the challenges faced by
societies today: religion is a social phenomenon (Johnstone 2008). In this sense,
quantifying Austria’s religious landscapes is not about setting a benchmark for a certain
level of religious diversity which would be deemed acceptable or threatening, it is
rather about testing what level of religious diversity can be expected when different
2 Within this research, we also looked at the religious landscape in Vienna. We report about this in Goujon
et al. (2017).
3 We acknowledge that religiously affiliated persons differ in terms of their religious commitment, practice and
in their religious beliefs; however, these other dimensions of religiosity are not available in the census data and
therefore a challenge for future modelling.
4 In the 2001 Austrian census, respondents were asked for their religious affiliation and could select among
several choices (Roman Catholic, Lutheran AB, Reformed HB, Old Catholics, Islam, Jewish, No religion) or
write down another religious affiliation not mentioned above.
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demographic and secularisation directions are followed. It is, first, a matter of pre-
paredness as several direct implications can be derived from such a study, for instance,
addressing the availability of religious teaching in the public schools or availability of
places of worship. Second, and more importantly, the necessity to research the religious
composition arises in opposition to speculations about the actual size of religious
groups that have been very present in the public discourse for the last two decades,
and increasingly so. The desirability and handling of a multicultural and religiously
pluralist society are topics of debates.5 The sizes of secular and religious populations
are therefore essential socio-cultural characteristics of a society. In opposition to
speculations, the work presented in this article, while sometimes using approximations
due to incompleteness of data, follows a scientifically rigorous approach.
In this article, we go beyond the discussion of religious diversity in terms of the sizes
of religious groups and focus more specifically on the role and implications of
international migration on the age and sex composition within and across religious
groups. There is not enough published literature on demographic ageing within specific
religious groups and we are aiming to address this gap. The ageing of European
populations is well under way and should continue in the future but the pace of ageing
would differ across religious groups due to the following main reasons: international
migration, population momentum, fertility differentials between religious groups and
differences in secularisation. We are particularly interested in addressing the role of
international migration because the continuous influx of young immigrants can main-
tain youthful age composition of some religious groups while others may be ageing at a
different pace under different volumes and compositions of migrants with respect to the
sending countries. Migrants are usually younger than the general population (Rogers
and Castro 1982) and their sex ratio can also vary from the general population. By their
differentiated pattern of fertility, they can also impact on the population’s age
composition.
While the role of immigration in the increasing religious diversity is often and
rightly put forward, international migrants, if of the same religious faith as the host
country population, can also contribute to the growth of the established religions and
may also rejuvenate the stocks of religiously affiliated. We empirically test this
possibility.
Last but not least, we ask whether and what migration scenarios can hamper the
ongoing secularisation. Kaufmann (2010) argues that international immigration can act
as a counter-secularisation force.
The article is organised in the following way. After this introduction, the second
section develops the methodology and presents the data used for estimating the
religious affiliation of the population in Austria in 2016 and projecting it to 2046.
The third section describes the results of the exercise in terms of size and shares of the
5 In Austria as in many European countries, many political campaigns focus on Muslims and Islam. For
instance, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) used the slogan BIslamisierung gehört gestoppt^ (‘Islamisation
needs to be stopped’) in its 2017 parliamentary election campaign. Another example is the debate about the
publication of a report on Muslim kindergartens in Vienna: allegedly some officials of the Austrian govern-
ment influenced the text of the study originally developed by the University of Vienna to read more negative,
insinuating that Muslim kindergartens oppose integration efforts. [www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2017
/07/05/austria-muslim-kindergarten-study-reviewed-for-text-changes/RgD14ap1FLvxFYRUUCiB2I/story.
html] (accessed on 25/9/2017)
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main religious groups in Austria within the next 30 years and looks at the implications
of the different scenarios on the population’s age and sex structure. We conclude by a
discussion that contextualises the results beyond religion per se and suggest other
explanatory indicators of variations in demographic behaviour, for instance, education-
al characteristics of different subpopulations.
Methodology and Data
This work employs the demographic methodology of multistate population projections
(Rogers 1981), which is an extension of the cohort-component approach. In the latter,
projections are made by applying fertility, mortality and migration rates to the base-year
population divided by age and sex. In the multistate approach, the population is further
divided into religious categories to which are also applied fertility, mortality and
migration rates. Furthermore, the model is dynamic by having the possibility of
transitioning between states, i.e. considering the mobility of people between religious
categories. The method is used in two ways: First, we apply the projection modelling to
reconstruct the religious composition of the population in Austria in 2016, starting from
the base-year in 2001 when the latest data were collected. Second, we use the method to
project possible future compositions in 2046 based on four scenarios. We highlight the
main features of the methodology and data used. More details can be found in Goujon
et al. (2017).
Reconstruction
Baseline Population by Age, Sex and Religion
2001 is the last year when data on the religious affiliation of the population in Austria
were collected. Thus, the population on January 1, 20016 by age, sex and six religious
affiliations serves as the basis for the reconstruction. The six affiliations7 considered in
this research are Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims, other religions and
unaffiliated (i.e. persons with no stated religion).
Migration
Migration statistics8 by Statistik Austria (the national statistical office) comprise data on
immigration and emigration to and from Austria by age, sex and country of birth. In the
absence of concrete data on the religious denomination of migrants, the ‘random
6 The census was collected as of May 15, 2001 and the population numbers for January 1, 2001 by religion,
age and sex were derived using Population Analysis Spreadsheets (Arriaga et al. 1994).
7 While we were able to distinguish between several Christian affiliations (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox),
the data do not allow splitting the Muslim group into denominations such as Sunni and Shia Islam for instance.
8 Since 2002, migration statistics have been based on administrative registrations and de-registrations derived
from the Central Register of Residence. The transition from the previous system to the new one invariably led
to a break in the time series. Hence, Statistik Austria provides estimated totals for immigration and emigration
for 2001; drawing on these total numbers, the proportional distribution by sex, age and country of birth was
estimated based on the year 2002.
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migrant assumption’ was used to link migrants with religious affiliations, assuming that
migrants have the same distribution as the population in their country of birth.9 This
assumption is strong as in some instances political oppression, human rights abuse,
violent conflict and state failure are essential determinants of (asylum) migration and
can be associated with specific subpopulations, including religious minorities
(Neumayer 2005). However, in the absence of more precise data or other proxy
variables such as the region of origin, ethnicity or education, the random migrant
assumption is the best approximation method. The religious compositions in the
respective countries of birth are retrieved in two ways: for the most prominent sending
countries, we collected up-to-date data on religious distribution from national statistics
(census 2011 rounds) whenever these were available.10 For other countries, we relied
on data published by the Pew Research Center (2011, 2012). Based on this information,
net migration by age, sex and religious affiliation was computed in 5-year steps for
2001–05, 2006–10 and 2011–15.
Fertility
Computation of fertility rates by religion requires information, firstly, on the number of
live births to mothers by age and their religious affiliation, and secondly, on the number
of women of reproductive age (generally 15 to 49 years) by religious affiliation.
Statistik Austria collects and publishes data on the religion of mothers of every child
born.11 However, data on the number of women by age and religion (exposure) are not
available. Exposures are therefore derived from the present reconstruction and fertility
rates are deduced iteratively for 2001–05, 2006–10 and 2011–15.
Mortality
The evidence of a relation between religion and mortality is inconclusive. While some
studies find religiosity to be associated with better health outcomes (Hummer et al.
2004), others suggest that as more religious people tend to have lower education levels
(Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008), they would have worse health outcomes (Groot and Van
Den Brink 2007). Moreover, some of the mortality advantage shown in the case of
religious minorities originating from migration can often be explained by two consid-
erations. First, the fact that only the healthiest can migrate—the so-called healthy
migrant effect—and second that returning migrants to their country of birth at old
age—sometimes called the salmon effect—are not removed from the registration
system and therefore are still accounted for in the exposure (Klotz and Gisser 2015).
Hence, the projections do not take into account mortality differentials. We used the
mortality rates by age and sex, available from Statistik Austria, and keep them identical
across all religious affiliations.
9 Religious affiliation was inferred from the country of birth rather than citizenship because citizenship can be
acquired in the years following the arrival into the country and thus might conceal distinct demographic
behaviours of immigrants.
10 For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary,
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Switzerland.
11 Information on the religion of the mother is available from the birth register but contains several deficiencies
(Goujon et al. 2017).
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Secularisation
Besides demographic processes, religious change is an important development that can
have a significant impact on the religious composition of the population. We do not
consider switching between religious affiliations, assuming this phenomenon to be
marginal considering the large religious groups that we are observing. However,
secularisation—the mobility from any religious affiliation to the unaffiliated group—
is an important aspect influencing the size of religious groups. Annual statistics on
members leaving the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church exist as those
church members are taxed based on their income. We calculate secularisation rates by
iteration based on the number of members (exposure) in a given period at the time.12
Secularisation rates are disaggregated by age following earlier work (Goujon et al.
2007) and sex following the Gender and Generations Survey (GGS year). There are no
official statistics on secularisation for Orthodox Christians and Muslims; we therefore
turned to the GGS and estimated probabilities of secularisation.
Projections
In contrast to our reconstruction of the past, we have no information about the different
components of change for the future. Scenarios are commonly used in population
projections to show the uncertainty about future developments (van der Heijden 1996).
We use projection scenarios to outline possible alternative futures that allow us to
explore various hypothetical sizes and compositions of migration flows. In our explo-
ration of the potential future religious composition of Austria’s population, prime focus
is given to international migration, as Goujon (2014) has shown that migration was
among the key drivers shaping the religious landscape in the past. The other determi-
nants—demographics (fertility) and religion (secularisation)—are derived to be con-
sistent with the migration narratives and in agreement with scientific knowledge. To
study the effect of international migration, we complement these four scenarios with
corresponding zero migration scenarios13 to allow for quantification of the impact of
international migration on the ageing of religious groups.
The following table (Table 1) gives an overview of the main components of the four
narratives, while in the next sections, the assumptions are outlined in more detail.
Migration
The four migration narratives differ in both the size and composition of immigration
and emigration flows.
– The scenario European mobility follows the main scenario of Statistik Austria’s
population projections (2016) in terms of the volume of migration flows (with
12 Secularisation data contain the absolute number of leavers. In order to calculate the rates, we need to derive
the exposure every 5-year period.
13 In contrast to the Closed-borders scenario, the zero-migration scenarios do not include any migration flows
right from the beginning of the projections. Regarding fertility and secularisation assumptions, the zero-
migration scenarios correspond to their respective primary narratives. In total, eight scenarios are examined.
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average numbers of 152,000 immigrants and 116,000 emigrants per year). We
further combine the immigration flows with a composition dominated by Euro-
peans with predominantly Christian affiliations and a significant share of unaffil-
iated persons, similar to the migration patterns observed in Austria in 2006–2010,
when migration was restricted by law and the financial and economic crisis
reduced labour migration.
– Similar to the European mobility scenario, the projected migration numbers in the
Diversity scenario follow the main scenario of Statistik Austria (2016). The
religious composition of migration flows, however, refers to the period 2011–
2015 with a rather strong non-European component in immigration: Afghanistan,
Syria, Iran and Iraq, countries with an overwhelmingly Muslim population, are
among the most prominent sending countries.
– In the Closed-borders scenarioAustria seals its borders and international migration
comes to a halt by 2021. In the first projection period 2016–2020, the low-
migration scenario of Statistik Austria (2016) serves as a reference for the migra-
tion volume (with average numbers of 152,000 immigrants and 105,000 emigrants
per year until 2020), with the flows being composed of a considerable share of
immigrants from non-European countries, similar to what was observed in 2011–
2015.
– In the High-immigration scenario, Austria is more permissive to immigration and
the number of immigrants follows the High-immigration scenario of Statistik
Austria (2016) which projects a migration volume with average numbers of
182,000 immigrants and 124,000 emigrants per year—numbers which are
Table 1 Scenario narratives in a nutshell
European
mobility
Diversity Closed-borders High-immigration
Migration Migration flows
are mostly
composed of
migrants
from Europe
Migrations patterns are
characterised by a
stronger non-European
component compared
to the European mobil-
ity scenario
International
migration
comes to a halt
by 2021 as
Austria seals its
borders
Austria welcomes large
numbers of migrants,
who come
predominantly from
the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA)a
and from sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) countries
Fertility Medium
convergence
across
religions
Medium convergence
across religions
Fast convergence
across religions
Slow convergence across
religions
Secularisation Secularisation
rates remain
constant
Secularisation rates
remain constant
Increase in
secularisation
rates until
2026–2031,
then they are
kept constant
Decrease in secularisation
rates until 2026–2031,
then they are kept
constant
a Countries included in the MENA region for this research: Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Israel, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Yemen, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar and Bahrain
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substantially higher than in the past (128,000 immigrants and 85,000 emigrants on
average per year between 2001 and 2015). The additional immigration numbers
compared with the trend in 2011–2015 are assumed to originate from Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.
Fertility
The three fertility narratives differ in their pace of convergence across religious groups.
The convergence hypothesis is in line with the literature looking at religious differen-
tials across successive generations of migrants (Coleman 1994; Mayer and Riphahn
2000; Dubuc 2012; Kulu et al. 2017).and consequences of skewed sex ratios The
convergence assumption results in a substantial fertility decline among Muslims, while
there is a minimal fertility increase for all other religious groups. As to the overall
fertility of the total population, we follow the main scenario in the population projection
of Statistik Austria (2016).
– The European mobility scenario and the Diversity scenario are linked to the
medium-convergence narrative meaning that the TFRs of women across all reli-
gious groups would converge in 2071–2075 to a level of 1.59 children per woman.
– The Closed-borders scenario is combined with the fast-convergence narrative
where we assume the same TFRs for all women as early as 2046–2050. This
scenario results in the lowest fertility level for Muslims and highest for other
religious groups to a level of 1.57 children per woman.
– The High immigration scenario is paired with the slow-convergence narrative,
which entails the convergence of TFRs for all women only in 2100 to a level of
1.60 children per woman.
Mortality
Similar to the approach adopted for the reconstruction, mortality rates across religious
affiliations are kept identical. The overall mortality rates by sex are based on the
medium scenario of Statistik Austria which has life expectancy at birth increasing to
84 years for men and 88 years for women by 2041–2045.
Secularisation
We assume the share of the population who would move out of their present affiliation
to be linked with the immigration scenario: an increase in religious diversity due to high
migration would lower secularisation patterns, for religion would become more rele-
vant as an identity marker in a possibly more fragmented society. On the contrary, low
migration patterns would accelerate secularisation trends.
– In the scenarios European mobility and Diversity, we assume constant
secularisation rates based on the estimates for 2011–2015 until the end of the
projection period.
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– The Closed-borders scenario includes a general increase in secularisation rates (+
10% per period) until 2026–2031 after which the rates are kept constant until the
end of the projection period.
– In the scenario High-immigration, we assume a general decrease in secularisation
rates (− 10% per period) until 2026–31, with the rates staying constant afterwards.
Results
Diversity Driven by Immigration: Changing Religious Landscape in Austria
Since the 2001 census, the changing migration flows regarding countries of birth had
an impact on the religious composition of immigrants to Austria. In the first decade of
twenty-first century, the main countries of origin were Germany and eastern European
countries, i.e. countries with predominantly Christian or religiously unaffiliated popu-
lations (Table 2). Although there had been sizeable numbers of Muslim immigrants
before—especially from Turkey—a significant change in the patterns of migration
flows took place in the periods from 2011 to 2015 with more immigrants from Syria
and Afghanistan, both countries with overwhelmingly Muslim populations, joining the
top-ten list of sending countries to Austria for the first time. During the same period, the
share of the foreign-born population increased from 12.5% in the 2001 census to 18.2%
as of 1 January 2016 (Eurostat online database). The change in size and composition
depicts the rapid changes of the past 15 years: the fraction of the European14 foreign-
born population declined between 2001 and 2016 from 74% to about 57% of the
foreign-born.
As a result, the reconstructed population of 2016 by religion shows noticeable
changes since the last measurement in 2001 (Fig. 1): the secularisation trend has
continued, and the share of Roman Catholics has declined further from 3/4 of the
population in 2001 to 2/3 in 2016. The largest absolute gains were among the
unaffiliated (17% of the population in 2016 compared to 12% in 2001). The Orthodox
and Muslim communities have also grown substantially: the share of Orthodox has
more than doubled from 2 to 5%, and Muslims have increased their share from 4 to 8%
between 2001 and 2016. The relative shares of Protestants and other religions remain
unchanged.
All four projection scenarios confirm that religious homogeneity would further
diminish. The share of Roman Catholics would most likely drop below 50% by
2046. However, in all scenarios, Roman Catholics would still be the largest
religious group in Austria, accounting for 42% in the High-immigration scenario
and 47% in the Closed-borders scenario. High immigration would result in the
largest religious diversity with a smaller representation of both Roman Catholics
and unaffiliated persons. All scenarios show an increase in minority religions
(Muslims and Orthodox), composed mainly of immigrants. The strong European
immigration component in the European mobility and Diversity scenarios would
14 EU-15, former Yugoslav republics, Romania, Poland, Switzerland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary; not
including ex-USSR countries.
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result in the fastest growth of the Orthodox to about 9% of the Austrian popula-
tion, while in the High-immigration scenario, Muslims would become the second
largest religious group in Austria, on a par with the unaffiliated at 21%. The
increase in Muslim population would be slightly smaller in the Diversity scenario.
The Muslim population has already experienced a sharp growth, from around 4%
in 2001 to 8% in 2016, and the most recent immigration wave with strong Syrian
and Afghani population components has contributed to the sharp increase com-
pared to previous years.
The High-immigration scenario illustrates how significant immigration flows may
work against the secularisation trend. The high influx of immigrants from societies
where religion is still highly relevant would depress the relative share of the unaffili-
ated, unless the immigrants themselves secularise at a similar rate as the host popula-
tion.15 In contrast, secularisation has a stronger impact on religious change in the
Closed-borders scenario, projecting the highest share of unaffiliated persons (28%).
The share of other religions (mainly Hindus, Buddhists and Jews) is estimated to
remain at the same level as in 2016 (about 2%) across all four scenarios. This is the
result of the scenario assumptions envisaging mainly a diversification of religions in
Austria to occur through the expansion of already established and growing religious
communities such as Orthodox and Muslims, coming from a set of presently sending
countries.
15 However, results from the Gender and Generations Survey show lower secularisation rates among the
Muslims and Orthodox compared to Roman Catholics and Protestants.
Table 2 Immigration from abroad to Austria: top-10 countries of birth and the number of immigrants in the
respective periods
2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015
Germany 58,726 Germany 86,947 Germany 85,194
Serbia and Montenegro 54,312 Romania 44,317 Romania 77,819
Turkey 48,940 Hungary 25,407 Hungary 61,218
Bosnia and Herzegovina 29,791 Poland 25,239 Serbia 39,495
Romania 26,704 Turkey 24,915 Poland 36,489
Poland 24,296 Slovakia 19,887 Bosnia and Herzegovina 36,187
Russian Federation 18,911 Bosnia and Herzegovina 18,927 Syria 34,977
Hungary 15,177 Serbia 15,702 Afghanistan 31,971
Slovakia 14,741 Serbia and Montenegro 14,190 Slovakia 29,422
Croatia 10,912 Russian Federation 12,946 Turkey 21,179
Source: Statistik Austria
Note: Serbia and Montenegro dissolved in 2006; however, they were pooled together in migration statistics
until 2007 and counted separately only from 2008 onwards. Austrians returning back to the country after
having lived abroad are one of the largest groups ranking within the top three countries of birth in all three
periods. However, since this group is not in the focus of migration policy measures, it is not displayed in
Table 2.
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Immigration of Limited Importance for Slower Population Ageing and Only
for Smaller Religious Groups
The vitality of religious communities does not only depend on group size16 but also on
the age composition. Youthful religious groups have more potential for further growth.
To study the age impact of different scenarios at the level of religious affiliations, we
split the population into three age groups: 0–34 (young), 35–64 (middle age), and 65+
(elderly). Population ageing will be a reality for all religious groups in Austria, and the
share of the elderly population would grow among all religious groups in all scenarios.
In this sense, population ageing is inevitable and could not be reversed under the
envisaged scenarios. However, immigration could alter the pace of ageing and slow
down the decline in the share of the young population.
The projection results show that this would be true for minority religious groups that
are already composed mainly of immigrants—Muslims and Orthodox—but also for
Protestants who were the religious group with the highest share of elderly people in
2016 (27%) (see Fig. 2, blue lines for the share of elderly persons).
In all but the Closed-borders scenario would the share of young Orthodox increase
by 5–10 percentage points (pp) compared to a scenario with zero migration (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, the share of elderly Orthodox would stay below 15%, and the share of
young Orthodox would drop below 50% just after 2031 in all except the Closed-
borders scenario. The Muslim population, however, would fall below 50% only in the
case of the Closed-borders scenario. The age structure of Muslims would remain very
young, with about 65% of the population in the 0–34 age group. However, the share of
the elderly Muslim population would also increase, from 4% in 2016 to about 10% in
2046 in all but Closed-borders scenario (16%) as generations of the early migration
waves grow older.
Among all religious groups, international migration has the most significant effect
on the age structure of Protestants. Between 2001 and 2016, the share of young
Protestants declined from 40 to 36%. The several scenarios with their diverse migration
16 In particular on the numbers of practicing members that are also a function of the number of nominal
members.
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Fig. 1 Religious composition in Austria, 2001–2046. Source: Statistik Austria, authors’ calculations
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flows and compositions lead to very different futures. Except for the Closed-borders
scenario, immigration would raise the share of young Protestants (age 0–34) by about
5–10 pp until 2046, and lower the share of elderly (65+) by 7–13 pp in 2046 (difference
in shares between zero migration scenario and scenarios with migration, see bars in the
chart). The Closed-borders scenario would lead to very fast population ageing, and
nearly 50% of Protestants in Austria would be 65+ in 2046. The European mobility and
High-immigration scenarios would slow down the increase in the proportion of 65+ age
group to 35 and 33 pp, respectively. These two scenarios would also lead to a sustained,
and in the first years even slightly increased, share of young members.
Although the European mobility and the High-immigration scenarios would both
sustain a younger Protestant population than in the absence of migration, there is a
substantial variation in the diversity within the Protestant group. While the European
mobility scenario would bring in mostly new Protestants from long-established Evan-
gelic churches (such as Lutherans and Calvinists), the High-immigration scenario
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would potentially greatly diversify the Protestant community. More than 50% of all
Christians in sub-Saharan Africa are Protestants, and many of them are Pentecostals,
Anglicans or belonging to African independent churches (PEW 2011). Thus, this
scenario would be likely to lead to the emergence of new or hitherto little represented
Protestant churches, meaning that the Protestant population in Austria would become
more heterogeneous. It may lead to the situation when traditional, historically
established Protestant churches would face intense ageing, while the new churches
would grow as they would be composed of young and largely foreign-born believers.
This scenario would greatly diversify the Christian communities in Austria and affect
the position of the long-established, traditional churches.
If we study Roman Catholics, the second oldest religious group in Austria after the
Protestants, we see that immigration has little effect on the rejuvenation of their age
structures. All four scenarios lead to very similar estimated shares of the young and old.
This applies even to the European mobility scenario that would bring in more immi-
grants from countries with high shares of Roman Catholics. A strong influx of
immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa like under the High-immigration scenario would
not increase the share of young Roman Catholics because Christians from this region
are rather a mixed group of different Christian churches, not necessarily belonging to
the Roman Catholic denomination. Thus, the share of elderly Roman Catholics would
increase to 36–39% (up from 16% in 2001 and 21% in 2016), and the share of the 0–34
age group would drop from 45% in 2001 to about 31% in 2046. Thus, the effect of
immigration on the age composition (measured as differences in shares between the
migration scenarios and zero migration scenarios) is very limited: in all scenarios,
immigration raises the share of the young only by about 1% and depresses the share of
the elderly to 1–2%. However, the Closed-borders scenario would lead to Roman
Catholics ageing most quickly.
Similarly, the unaffiliated are not affected much by the different scenarios in their
estimated trajectories of population ageing. The effect is only slightly more pronounced
for Roman Catholics. Between 2001 and 2016, population ageing has been rather stable
and the share of young persons increased from 28 to 33%, mostly due to ongoing rapid
secularisation, and by 2046, the share is expected to remain very stable, at about 33–
31%. The share of the population 65+ is, however, bound to increase from currently
about 17 to 23%. As expected, the European mobility scenario with the highest influx
of religiously unaffiliated immigrants across all scenarios would make the greatest
difference, raising the share of the young by about 2.7% while depressing the increase
in 65+ by up to 2.5%.
Intense Immigration Can Offset Sex Balance for Some Religions
The findings show that immigration could have a stronger effect on sex balance than on
the age composition of the religious groups. Sex ratio changes with age: in western
Europe, about 105 boys are being born for every 100 girls. Subsequently, differential
mortality alters the sex ratio, and with increasing age, we typically find more women in
human populations (Coale 1991). Immigration and emigration also impact on the age
composition of adult populations, depending on the sex and age composition of the
flow that can vary for different groups of migrants. In Austria, immigrants from
European countries arriving in 2005–2009 were predominantly women, while asylum
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seeker flows of 2015 were male-dominated. In addition, secularisation rates that have
been stronger for men than for women in Austria could also impact the sex balance in
religious groups.
We focus in this section on the sex ratio among 20–34-year-olds rather than among
the total population. The sex ratio in young adulthood is of particular importance
because it is the time of family formation, especially so for the groups with high
homogamy, such as ethnically and religiously different migrants. This is particularly the
case for Muslims and Hindus in Europe (Lucassen and Laarman 2009). Lack of
potential spouses may result in further migration on the basis of family reunification
pressure if intermarriage is not socially approved and social ties to the communities of
origin remain strong (Carol et al. 2014).
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20–34 by religious group and scenario, 2001–2046. Source: authors’ calculations
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Only Roman Catholics show a nearly balanced and unchanging sex ratio at age 20–
34 through the whole period of observation from 2001 to 2046, regardless of the
scenario, while gender balance is less common among the other religious affiliations.
Between 2001 and 2016, women were more numerous among the Orthodox, while
there were more men among Muslims, Protestants and the unaffiliated (Fig. 3).
The sex ratio of the Muslim population is exceedingly sensitive to the composition
of immigration flows. Due to male-dominated migration flows, the sex ratio for the
Muslim population has increased from an only slight (about 113 men per 100 women
over the 2001–2011 period) to a more pronounced male dominance in 2016 (130 men
per 100 women). Would the sex composition of migrants remain the same as in the
period 2011–2015 (Diversity scenario), the sex ratio for Muslims would further
increase and exceed 150 men per 100 women by 2031. In the High-immigration
scenario, the imbalance in the sex ratio is even more pronounced. Only the European
mobility scenario, with higher proportions of women among immigrants, would lead
gradually to a more balanced sex composition among Muslims in the next decades.
By contrast, more women could be found among the Orthodox and others during
2001–2016, with a trend towards more gender-balanced composition among 20–34-
year-olds. For the Orthodox, the Closed-borders scenario would yield the fastest trend
towards gender balance, while the European mobility scenario would offset the balance
to about 80–85 men per 100 women.
The sex composition of Protestants may change from a slight male surplus (1.13 to
1.11 in 2001–2016) to a female majority under the European mobility scenario, while
the Diversity and Closed-borders scenarios would gradually lead to a balanced sex
composition. Only the high influx of immigrants envisaged in the High-immigration
scenario would reverse the trend towards a more male-dominated sex composition.
In contrast, the unaffiliated used to be a group with more men of 20–34 years than
women—133 per 100 in 2001 (about same as estimated for Muslims in 2016), due to
higher secularisation rates among men. By 2016, these groups became more gender-
balanced (109 men per 100 women), but only the High-immigration scenario would
result in a true sex balance.
Discussion and Conclusion
While the projections demonstrate some of the possible situations that Austria could
experience in the future, and those are all quite dissimilar, they also show that religious
diversity is bound to increase while religious homogeneity will be diminishing. The
split between the religiously affiliated and unaffiliated population might be less and less
relevant—although it might have implications as the unaffiliated tend to be less prone
to vote for populist political parties for instance (Marzouki et al. 2016)—and it might be
more the co-existence of different religious groups that will require the attention of the
various stakeholders. In addition, volatile migration trends that bring together a mix of
people from new ethnicities and cultural traditions will further diversify the religious
traditions within some religions and lead to a super-diversity of transnationally con-
nected and socio-economically diversified immigrants (Vertovec 2007). These obser-
vations are in line with the post-secular theory—see Kaufmann (2010).
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The Austrian situation is not unique in Europe and most western European countries
are undergoing similar experiences. Profound transformations of Europe’s religious
landscape have been referred to as a ‘soft revolution’ (Goujon 2014; Goujon and Bauer
2015)—revolution because it affects Christianity which has long been considered the
‘foundation of a common European identity’ (Halman and Riis 2003, p. 1) and soft
because it is neither violent or sudden, nor is it an organised movement but rather a
development that progresses gradually but surely through different societal mecha-
nisms. On the one hand, many Europeans have a low sense of religious belonging,
having become secularised or turned towards various forms of diffuse religiosity
(Cipriani 2017). On the other hand, religious diversity is on the rise, as during the last
decades, many European countries have become major receivers of international
immigrants who often have a different religion, raising important challenges for how
European policymakers manage cultural diversity and accommodate minorities. The
increasing number of international migrants, including their descendants, is the main
driver of socio-demographic, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in destination
countries, where new arrivals have come with an array of religious denominations that
previously had often been just marginal or non-existent.
Our second research question referred to the consequences that international migra-
tion to Austria will have on secularisation. The presented scenarios confirm the power
of demographic change on the slow-down of secularisation (Kaufmann 2010; Hackett
et al. 2015). The high-migration scenario leads to a 7 pp slower rise of the religiously
non-affiliated group.
Third, we addressed the effect of international migration on the pace of the ageing
process within religious groups. The groups composed largely of previously arrived
migrants are bound to age unless they have high fertility. As expected, we find that the
volume and composition of international migrants can maintain youthful age compo-
sitions in minority religions—Muslims and Orthodox. Sustained immigration leads to
slower ageing; however, not even high immigration can stop or even reverse the
process. Youthful age structures could help in maintaining the vitality and collective
vision of religious groups (Eisenstadt 1956) and sustain future growth if a large
proportion of the population are in childbearing age and have relatively high fertility
preferences (McQuillan 2004).
Interestingly, we find much stronger an implication of high immigration on the sex
composition than on the age structures. High immigration may lead to skewed sex
ratios (Dyson 2012) and influence the actual reproductive potential if the sex balance is
not achieved among the people of childbearing age. Imbalanced sex ratios may even
lead to additional migration if religion is an essential characteristic for the marriage
partner, intermarriage is rare and ties to the home communities remain strong.
The decline in group size and the ageing process of the majority religious group, i.e.
Roman Catholics, contrasts with the experience of the more rapidly growing minority
religions. With higher fertility and greater immigration, the groups of the Muslims and
the Orthodox will not age nearly as rapidly as the Roman Catholics. The disparity
between older majority and younger minority religious groups will further increase the
cultural generation gap with implications for public spending, voting preferences and
political representation, to name but a few. Our results, however, also emphasise that
the elderly population that is now religiously more homogeneous than the younger
cohorts, will increase in religious diversity. In 2016, only 3% of the population 65+ in
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Austria were Muslims or Orthodox. In 2046, this number will range between 10 and
11.5%, depending on the scenario. The experience from the already ageing migrants
who came as ‘guest workers’ to western Europe shows that many stay and do not return
to their home countries like the guest worker policies originally envisaged. The social
services for elderly people will have to adapt to the increasing religious diversity of the
elderly population and distinct cultural traditions embedded in these newly emerging
religions. Further research is needed to address the challenges arising from possible
cumulative disadvantages caused by a combination of age, gender, migration status,
ethnicity (Mutchler and Burr 2011) and religion.
This paper has several recognised limitations. First of all, we look at large
religious groups, e.g. Muslims which may hide the de-facto heterogeneities be-
tween the many existing religious denominations. Another caveat is that the
projections and their analysis do not inform about the level of religiosity of the
affiliated. Religiosity is important inasmuch as it indicates the level of adherence
of members, which delineates some of their demographic behaviours. Moreover,
religiosity varies between natives and first-generation immigrants as well as
among immigrants. It has been shown that people belonging to minority religions
tend to have a higher level of religious intensity in order to strengthen their self-
identity, but also they often come from countries where religion remains important
in shaping the social life and religiosity is stronger in terms of beliefs and practice.
At the same time, descendants of immigrants (the second generation) usually show
a general convergence towards the religious intensity levels and demographic
behaviours of the host society (Inglehart and Norris 2009). However, modelling
and projecting religiosity is even more complex than modelling religious affilia-
tion. Data are harder to come by as they are usually collected by small sample
surveys that tend to undersample minority and migrant religions. There are also
certain problems about choosing indicators that reflect the level of religiosity in
the same way for all religions, and that are not too volatile. While projections of
both religiosity and religious affiliation exist (Stonawski et al. 2015; Kaufmann
et al. 2010), they imply making even more challenging assumptions about the
future. The last but not least limitation is that religion hides many other individual
variables that can be essential for future developments. Other socio-cultural and
socio-economic characteristics, such as nativity status, country of origin, educa-
tional attainment or labour force participation, may be underlying factors of
demographic behaviour, particularly fertility in some religious groups. For in-
stance, evidence from census 2001 in Austria shows that the fertility of Muslim
women in Austria is high because many have low education. However, those
Muslim women who are highly educated have similar fertility outcomes as highly
educated Roman Catholic women in Austria (Goujon et al. 2017).
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